US Terrorist Listings on HTS and How They Relate to UN Designations

US Terrorist Listings on HTS and How They Relate to UN Designations

Karam Shaar and Vittorio Maresca di Serracapriola

Summary

The United States uses two primary mechanisms to designate terrorist groups and individuals: the Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) designation and the Specifically Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) designation, each with distinct legal and financial implications. Ahmad al-Sharaa (formerly Abu Mohammad al-Jolani), Syria’s Interim President and de facto leader, is sanctioned under the SDGT designation alone, while his group Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) is designated as both an FTO and an SDGT. In addition to US sanctions, al-Sharaa and HTS are listed under the UN ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaeda sanctions framework (known as a “regime”). The US implements UN sanctions through Executive Orders and Acts of Congress, but does not automatically lift sanctions when the UN removes individuals or groups from its lists. 

Understanding US Terror-Related Sanctions

The United States has two main authorities for terrorism designations of groups and individuals.  Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the Secretary of State can designate groups as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs). Executive Order (EO) 13224 (GW Bush, 2001) expands this authority by allowing the designation of terrorist groups, affiliated individuals, financiers, and front companies as Specifically Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs). 

Both the FTO¹ and SDGT² designations impose severe restrictions, making any dealings with HTS legally toxic by prohibiting the provision of “material support”—a broad term that includes not only financial assistance but also training, logistical aid, and other forms of support. Violators face severe penalties, including fines reaching hundreds of thousands of dollars and prison sentences spanning decades. 

FTO designation aims to cut off support for terrorist activities and to pressure groups to abandon terrorism. The State Department’s Bureau of Counterterrorism (CT) monitors global terrorist organizations to identify potential targets. Once CT identifies a group, it compiles an administrative record, typically including classified and open-source information, to demonstrate that the group meets statutory criteria for designation. If the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Treasury Secretary, approves the designation, they notify Congress, which then has seven days to review it. If Congress does not block the designation, the State Department publishes it in the Federal Register, making it official. 

Under EO 13244, the US government designates terrorist groups, affiliated individuals, financiers, corporations, and associations as SDGTs under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). While both the State Department and the Treasury Department can designate SDGTs, only the State Department designates FTOs. The Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), which enforces US economic and trade sanctions, maintains the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list, which includes SDGTs and FTOs. OFAC enforces sanctions against SDNs by targeting front companies, parastatal entities, and individuals acting for or on behalf of sanctioned groups or states, including known terrorists. 

Removal Processes

Sanctions listings and delistings can impact the conditions under which negotiations with HTS take place. They can be used to incentivize changes in behavior, shaping stakeholder reputations, restricting or enabling travel, ensuring agreement adherence, and influencing peace stabilization efforts. 

Organizations designated as FTOs have two main options to challenge their designation. Within 30 days of publication in the Federal Register, an FTO can appeal its designation in the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Alternatively, under the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), an FTO can file a petition for revocation two years after its designation date (or most recent redesignation) or two years after a prior petition’s denial (Figure 1). 

To secure removal, an organization must provide evidence that circumstances forming the basis for the designation have changed in such a manner as to warrant revocation. Separately, the Secretary of State must review each FTO designation at least once every five years to assess whether revocation is warranted. The Secretary of State may revoke a designation at any time if circumstances forming the basis for the designation change sufficiently or if doing so serves US national security interests (Figure 2). 

Additionally, Congress can revoke a designation through legislation, and Courts can overturn it through judicial review. However, in the current US context under President Trump, legislative revocation remains unlikely, as both chambers of Congress are controlled by the same party as the president, making it less likely to challenge or overturn executive decisions on FTO designations. 

Figure 1: FTO Petition to State Department 

Figure 2: Secretary of State Review 

For individuals or entities seeking removal from the SDGT list, the process begins with a written request to OFAC, submitted by the listed persons or their authorized representatives. The request initiates a review process that applies even to those designated under State Department authority (Figure 3). 

Depending on the underlying authority used to designate an SDGT, different US government agencies may oversee the delisting process. If the State Department, in consultation with the Treasury Department, made the designation, the State Department will also serve as the “adjudicating agency.” 

Figure 3: OFAC Delisting Procedure 

The process of delisting from US sanctions lists varies in duration, ranging from months to decades, and involves both technical reviews and political considerations. Agencies like OFAC and the State Department conduct assessments based on legal and policy criteria. Political leadership, however, plays a decisive role. 

For instance, in January 2021 the outgoing Trump administration designated the Houthis, an Iranian-backed militant group, as an FTO. Within one month of taking office, the incoming Biden administration revoked the designation, citing concerns that it could impede the delivery of humanitarian assistance or undermine ceasefire negotiations in Yemen. While technical evaluations inform the process, broader foreign and domestic political concerns ultimately shape the final outcome. 

US and UN Sanctions: Alignment and Divergence 

The US must implement UN sanctions adopted under Chapter VII Article 41 of the UN Charter, enforcing restrictive measures set by the UN Security Council (UNSC). These measures include freezing funds, financial assets, and economic resources; blocking travel; and preventing the supply, sale, or transfer of arms and dual-use technologies to designated individuals and entities. Pursuant to Resolution 2368 (2017), HTS is subject to all three restrictive measures. 

The US integrates UN sanctions lists into its domestic legal framework through Executive Orders and Acts of Congress rather than adopting them wholesale. This results in their distribution across multiple sanctions programs, each with a distinct scope and enforcement process. 

While the US has a clear obligation to implement UN sanctions and listings, delistings follow a less straightforward process. Unlike listings, which the UNSC mandates through Chapter VII resolutions, delistings do not carry the same binding requirement. When the UN Secretariat updates its consolidated list to reflect a delisting, the US interprets it as a cessation of the obligation to sanction, not an obligation to end the sanctions. 

As a result, UN delistings do not always lead to US delistings. The US sometimes continues sanctioning individuals and entities even after their removal from the UN list. For instance, an analysis of UN delistings under the ISIL/Al-Qaeda regime shows that the US has maintained autonomous sanctions on several entities despite their removal from the UN list. In such cases, a UN delisting has no practical effect on those still subject to US sanctions. 

One notable example is Al-Barakat, a Somali banking and money transfer group. In February 2012, the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaeda Sanctions Committee delisted Al-Barakat’s group of companies after reviewing a request submitted through the Ombudsperson. However, OFAC did not lift its sanctions on the group until February 2020—eight years later. Unlike in other UN sanctions regimes, where a permanent Security Council member can unilaterally block a delisting, the ISIL/Al-Qaeda regime requires a unanimous negative vote within the Committee to overturn an Ombudsperson recommendation.  

Under the Committee Guidelines (2024), a Committee member can request that the Chair submit the Recommendation to Delist to the UNSC for a decision. The US had the option to escalate Al-Barakat’s case by making such a request, which would have allowed it to wield its veto power at the Security Council level. However, it chose not to, likely for diplomatic and legal reasons. Instead, it maintained unilateral sanctions through OFAC, which remained in effect long after the UN lifted its restrictions. Further investigation of the case is necessary, however, before drawing definite conclusions. 

As a member state, the US can formally request the delisting of Ahmad al-Sharaa and HTS from the UNSC’s sanctions list. Under the Committee Guidelines (2024), if the US (or any other member state) submits a delisting request, the Committee has ten working days to raise objections. If no Committee member objects, the Secretariat removes the designation. If one Committee member objects, the listing remains. This procedure gives every Committee member, regardless of their country’s veto power status at the UNSC, equal leverage to block a delisting. 

The Comparative Stringency of FTO, SDGT, and UN Sanctions 

The FTO, SDGT, and UN sanctions regimes impose varying levels of restrictions, each with distinct legal and financial implications. FTO designation carries the most severe criminal penalties. While both FTO and SDGT designations trigger asset freezes, only FTO designation automatically imposes immigration restrictions on the organization’s members. 

Additionally, FTO designation criminalizes knowingly providing “material support” or resources to the designated organization. Those convicted face up to 20 years in prison, or life imprisonment if the support results in death. The FTO statute also enforces civil penalties for noncompliance, particularly against financial institutions that fail to freeze required accounts, with fines reaching 50,000 USD per violation or double the amount the institution should have frozen or controlled. Unlike SDGT designation, FTO designation allows victims to sue for civil damages related to material support for terrorism. 

SDGT designation expands financial restrictions beyond US-based assets, allowing the US to sanction non-US persons or companies who transact with sanctioned individuals or entities, even outside US jurisdiction. For instance, in January 2016, the Treasury Department used EO 13224 to designate Spectrum Invest Group Holding SAL, a Lebanon-based telecommunications company, as part of a Hezbollah financial support network. 

EO 13244 authorizes up to 20 years in prison for providing material support, along with civil fines and property forfeitures. However, SDGT designation does not impose immigration restrictions or establish civil liability for attacks committed, planned, or authorized by SDGT-designated entities.  

UN sanctions apply globally but lack direct enforcement mechanisms. They require the US to freeze assets, impose visa bans, and enforce arms embargoes. Since UN sanctions do not impose penalties directly, enforcement depends on national legal frameworks. In the US, the legal consequences of noncompliance are determined through domestic legislation. The criminal penalties, civil fines, or financial liabilities resulting from UN designations vary based on the specific US sanctions regime used to implement them. 

Table 1: FTO, SDGT, and UN Sanctions: A Comparative Overview 

Dissolution

Several organizations have remained listed despite their dissolution and the absence of activities that would justify a terrorist designation. For example, the Abdallah Azzam Brigades continue to hold the same designation as HTS, even though they ceased operations years before officially disbanding in 2019. In practice, the impacts of continued listing would mostly apply to the individuals formerly affiliated with the group as opposed to the group itself.


References
1 Providing Material Support To Designated Terrorist Organizations (Fundraising), 18 USC §2339B
2 Criminalising Violations of Sanctions Imposed Under the IEEPA, 50 USC §1705
3 Restricted under UNSC Resolution 2368 (2017)
4 Restricted under 18 USC §2339B
5 Restricted under 50 USC §1705