Syrian and International Organizations Call on EU to End Assad-Era Sanctions on Syria Now
As the European Union prepares this week for its annual vote on the renewal of Council Decision 2011/273/CFSP and Council Regulation (EU) No 36/2012, we, the undersigned organisations, call for the unconditional non-renewal of the EU sanctions imposed on Syria. These sanctions were imposed in response to the grave abuses and crimes against humanity committed by the Assad regime. The EU also welcomed over 1.3 million Syrian refugees and contributed nearly $40 billion in aid, making it the leading humanitarian actor in the crisis. European courts have also been at the forefront of prosecuting Syrian war criminals, reinforcing the EU’s credibility in upholding international justice. Syrians will continue to be grateful for the EU’s overall principled stance towards the Syrian people.
However, the circumstances that justified these sanctions no longer exist: The Assad regime has collapsed. The framework underpinning the EU’s sanctions—explicitly tied to Assad’s conduct—is now without legal foundation. Moreover, despite the temptation to repurpose Assad-era sanctions to mold the new interim government in Syria to ensure inclusivity and pluralism, a wiser policy counsels the engagement of targeted methods to steer the Syrian government in a positive direction. Continuing to enforce the same instruments, however, contradicts both the letter and the spirit of Council Decision 2011/273/CFSP. It also economically punishes the same people and communities the EU purports to defend. The indefinite extension of the EU’s Assad-era sanctions, absent a credible legal basis and to pursue objectives disconnected from their original intent, raises fundamental concerns about the abuse of sanctions as a policy tool.
Furthermore, these legacy sanctions are now materially impeding Syria’s economic recovery. While the EU has introduced some suspensions and exemptions, their impact has been diluted by the overcast of remaining restrictions and the chilling effect of overcompliance in global financial and trade networks. Economic actors remain reluctant to engage with Syrians due to uncertainty and risk-aversion, which is compounded by the continued targeting of core state institutions such as the Central Bank, the oil sector regulator, and important state-affiliated utilities companies. As long as these structures remain sanctioned, exemptions will fail to translate into meaningful economic recovery, depriving the population of the preconditions for meeting basic needs, rebuilding services, and engaging in a democratic transition. In some cases, de-listing entities and removing designations will have little meaningful impact if overarching sanctions regulations remain in place. Furthermore, due to excessive de-risking and overcompliance, the mere presence of sanctions of any form is creating little incentive for potential European investors to engage with Syria.
Sanctions are also constraining the ability of Syrian civil society to play its role in shaping a democratic, rights-based transition. While civil society was long repressed under Assad, it has emerged as a central actor in supporting accountability, promoting inclusive governance, and delivering essential services in the post-Assad period. Yet EU sanctions, despite Assad’s downfall, continue to impede grassroots efforts to build a more just and resilient society. EU-based civil society organizations struggle to transfer funds from Europe to Syria due to restrictions on the banking sector. They also face mounting difficulties accessing digital tools, cloud services, and secure communication platforms. As a result, they are denied the very infrastructure needed for transparent reporting, inclusive consultation, and coordination with international partners.
Beyond questions of morality and legality, lifting Assad-era sanctions is also in the EU’s strategic interest. While civil society and international organisations working to support Syria’s transition remain heavily constrained, malign actors—such as criminal syndicates and militia-affiliated networks—continue to operate informally and benefit from opaque structures, rendering them paradoxically less restricted. This perverse dynamic is undermining the EU’s own vision for a democratic Syria and weakening the very actors most committed to the rule of law, gender equality, and transitional justice. By continuing to enforce outdated Assad-era sanctions, the EU risks unintentionally sidelining civil society—a counterweight to extremists—and empowering the very structures it once sought to dismantle.
Furthermore, economic stagnation is a major driver of outward migration, and Syrians continue to represent the largest group of asylum seekers in the Union. Facilitating economic recovery and dignified return must go hand in hand, and this is not merely a humanitarian imperative—but also a necessary step toward long-term regional stability and domestic cohesion within Europe. Syrians cannot rebuild their country if their financial system remains paralyzed, if essential goods remain restricted, and if investment is deterred by lingering ambiguities in the sanctions framework. The longer reconstruction is delayed, the higher the probability of sectarian violence, conflict, extremism, instability, and autocratization.
Finally, we recognize that certain individuals and entities continue to bear responsibility for war crimes and serious human rights violations, and these individuals and entities must remain sanctioned as a form of accountability. Targeted sanctions against these persons should be transferred from Council Regulation (EU) No 36/2012—the EU’s Syria sanctions regime—to the EU’s Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (GHRSR). The GHRSR was established in 2020 to enable targeted measures against perpetrators of grave abuses, regardless of geographic context. Pursuing sanctions against perpetrators and complicit persons under the GHRSR would allow the EU to maintain its commitment to accountability and human rights, still sanctioning former Assad regime officials and their cronies, while also removing outdated, overbroad restrictions that are now disproportionately impacting the civilian population in Syria.
📄 List of Signatory Organizations:
(تمكين مبادرات السلام واستراتيجيات التنفيذ)
(جمعية الحنين (نور وامل) لرعاية المصابين بالشلل الدماغي)
(مؤسسة حقولنا الخضراء للمشاريع الزراعية والحيوانية المستدامة)
(منظمة سراج الشام للتنمية و الرعاية الصحية)
(مكتب التنمية المحلية ودعم المشاريع الصغيرة)