Mapping Cross-Border Smuggling Networks Between Syria and Lebanon
Executive Summary
This report maps the smuggling networks operating between Syria and Lebanon, identifying key actors, routes, and methods involved in the trafficking of fuel, narcotics, and people. It examines the political, economic, and security conditions that sustain these operations and evaluates how shifting power dynamics—such as Hezbollah’s declining influence in Lebanon and the ousting of the Assad regime in Syria—are reshaping the landscape. The report concludes with policy recommendations to support a coordinated and comprehensive response to cross-border smuggling.
The research is based on a thorough review of open-source data covering the period from January 2011 to March 2025, using both automated and manual tools. This dataset was used to map smuggling actors and analyze their connections. By drawing on diverse sources, the report provides a detailed picture of these illicit networks and the broader socio-political context in which they operate.
The research findings reveal that smuggling between Syria and Lebanon has evolved over the past decade from a loosely connected network of independent actors into a highly organized system. The growing involvement of both state and non-state actors has strengthened these operations, making them deeply embedded and highly adaptable. Their lack of a rigid hierarchy allows them to absorb disruptions, shift strategies, and evade enforcement efforts.
While both the former Assad regime and Hezbollah have played roles in narcotics smuggling, their involvement differs. The Assad regime maintained centralized control over every stage of the captagon trade, from production to international distribution. Hezbollah, in contrast, seems to avoid direct involvement but provides protection for traffickers in exchange for financial and political benefits.
Fuel smuggling, unlike narcotics trafficking, is less centralized due to the broad range of actors involved and the fluid nature of supply and demand. Trade routes and key players shift in response to market conditions and enforcement efforts. Smuggling methods also vary depending on the scale of operations and the connections of those involved.
Human trafficking—a more recent phenomenon compared to fuel smuggling—has surged over the past decade due to ongoing violence, economic collapse, and worsening living conditions in Syria. Both Syrian and Lebanese smugglers play critical roles, with some operating independently and others linked to larger networks that extend beyond Lebanon.
Despite differences in the nature of these illicit activities, smuggling as a whole is not a fringe criminal enterprise but a deeply entrenched system sustained by political complicity, economic desperation, and institutional failure. Decades of weak border control, corruption, and economic disparities have created an environment where illicit trade is not just tolerated but actively facilitated, embedding it within the power structures of both countries.
Recent political shifts in Lebanon and Syria have altered the smuggling landscape but have not disrupted its operations. Entrenched networks, weak enforcement, and persistent economic pressures keep illicit trade alive. Authorities in both countries also appear selective in their crackdowns—prioritizing narcotics while largely ignoring fuel smuggling from Lebanon to Syria. On human smuggling, Lebanon focuses on stopping illegal Syrian entries, while Syria’s interim government treats it as a low priority.
Moving forward, smuggling between Syria and Lebanon is expected to continue, as efforts to counter these illicit activities will likely remain limited and selective. Fuel smuggling will probably continue to be tolerated, as it helps alleviate shortages in Syria without imposing costs on Lebanon. Drug trafficking is likely to face growing pressure from both Syrian and Lebanese authorities, but strong demand and limited enforcement capacity will keep it active. Human smuggling—particularly from Lebanon to Syria—is expected to continue with little interference. Meanwhile, Lebanon will likely maintain efforts to curb unauthorized Syrian entries, though these measures are unlikely to fully stop illicit cross-border activity.
A sustainable solution requires addressing the root causes—economic collapse, institutional fragility, and governance failures. Strengthening state institutions, improving cross-border cooperation, creating viable economic alternatives, and mitigating the unintended consequences of international sanctions are essential. Equally important is rooting out corruption within security and border agencies. Without real accountability and transparency, any crackdown will be short-lived, and smuggling networks will continue to exploit systemic weaknesses.